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lthough interest in the details of unemployment  
insurance (UI) financing is a minority pastime, even 
among economists, the topic is nonetheless an important one. 
Unemployment insurance is not just a way of ameliorating the 
impact of a recession on the unemployed; UI also has a 
potential role to play in making the recession itself less severe 
through its traditional automatic stabilizer role. Someone who 
has just lost their job is likely to curtail spending severely, which 
reduces overall aggregate demand and helps exacerbate the 
economic downturn. A properly designed UI programme can 
help reduce the impact of higher unemployment by supporting 
consumption by the unemployed. UI also has the advantage of 
responding quickly to a downturn: unlike discretionary fiscal 
policy, such as tax cuts, UI injects additional money into the 
economy as soon as unemployment starts rising; there is no 
need to wait for the administration to put a bill through 
congress.
Thus, it is important for policymakers to ask themselves 
whether the UI programme is fulfilling its macroeconomic role 
effectively, especially after a significant economic downturn 
occurs. The paper by Wayne Vroman allows us to do precisely 
that, by providing an in-depth investigation of how state UI 
systems responded to the 2001 recession.
The paper argues that although the decline in GDP was mild 
by historical standards, the average duration of unemployment 
was longer than usual. Furthermore, claims for regular UI 
benefits remained at a persistently high level for a significant 
period. These factors put pressure on state UI systems, 
especially on those states that did not build up their trust funds 
during the economic boom years of the 1990s. Some states 
raised UI payroll taxes to cope with the deterioration of their 
UI trust funds, whereas others were required to borrow. 
Because borrowing from the U.S. Treasury can be a very 
expensive undertaking, a few states issued bonds in the private 
capital market in order to maintain the solvency of their trust 
funds. Interestingly, those states that issued bonds in previous 
recessions did not have lower reserve ratios going into the 2001 
recession.
From the perspective of someone concerned with 
macroeconomic policy, the paper raises three important 
questions. First, was there really something unusual about the 
2001 recession? Or could state UI programmes have predicted 
the magnitude of the impact on labour markets and thus on 
trust fund balances? Second, did the state UI programmes 
respond as they should have to a negative macroeconomic 
shock? Did these programmes perform their automatic 
stabilizer function? Third, is the federal UI framework in which 
state systems function appropriate? Is borrowing from the 
U.S. Treasury too onerous for states, forcing them to raise or 
cut benefits, thereby exacerbating the impact of the recession? 
Or is borrowing too easy, giving states an incentive to be 
fiscally imprudent?
Beginning with the issue of the severity of the 2001 
recession, Vroman notes that the peak level of unemployment, 
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6.3 percent, was well below the peak in previous recessions. 
However, from the perspective of state UI systems, it is the 
change in the unemployment rate that is most relevant for 
explaining the change in reserve ratios. Here again, though, the 
trough-to-peak change in the unemployment rate in the 2001 
recession was only 2.5 percentage points, slightly lower than 
the 2.8-percentage-point change in the 1991 recession. On the 
surface, then, it might seem that states should have been able to 
predict, if not the timing, then at least the impact of the 2001 
recession on trust fund balances.1
One possible response to this conclusion is that the 
unemployment rate is the product of the incidence of 
unemployment and its duration, and that the way in which a 
given change in the unemployment rate is distributed among 
the unemployed population can have important implications 
for state UI systems. Vroman notes that unemployment 
durations were particularly long following the 2001 recession.
However, it is not obvious that longer unemployment 
durations put a much greater strain on state UI systems. It is 
true that very short UI spells tend to be relatively less costly for 
UI programmes, because many people will simply not bother 
to file a claim for a spell of unemployment lasting only a few 
weeks. It is also true that the proportion of short spells declines 
during a recession: the share of unemployed who had been 
without work for less than five weeks fell from 45 percent in 
2000 to 32 percent in 2003. However, there has also been a 
significant increase in the proportion of those who had been 
unemployed for more than twenty-six weeks, from 11 percent 
in 2000 to 22 percent in 2003. These people normally would 
have exhausted their entitlements to state UI benefits—
although they might have been eligible for temporary federal 
benefits—and so would not have been a drain on state UI 
funds.
Furthermore, the decline in the proportion of short-
duration unemployed and the increase in the proportion of 
long-duration unemployed that occurred as a result of the 2001 
recession were very similar to those following the 1991-92 
recession. Once again, it appears hard to argue that states could 
not have predicted the impact of the 2001 recession on the 
solvency of their UI funds.
One puzzle, then, that Vroman’s paper leaves unanswered is 
why reserve ratios were not built up during the 1990s in the 
same way they were after the admittedly more severe recession 
in 1982. Did states simply fall prey to the idea that the 
“Goldilocks” economy was a permanent feature of the 
economic landscape? Or was it simply more difficult to gain 
political support for raising contribution rates? This is an 
important question, because states will need to begin restoring 
reserve ratios soon if they are to be ready for the next 
downturn. It is a sobering thought that the average expansion 
since the war has lasted less than five years.
The second key issue raised by the paper is whether state UI 
programmes reacted appropriately to the 2001 recession. As we 
argue above, UI has an important macroeconomic policy role 
to play as an automatic stabilizer for the economy. In general, 
it appears that most state UI systems did perform their 
stabilizer function at least as well as they did in earlier 
recessions: reserve ratios fell by 1 percent of payrolls, a 
somewhat greater decline than in the early 1990s—despite the 
fact that ratios were somewhat lower at the beginning of the 
2001 recession than they were before the 1991-92 recession.
 Some states, however, did raise UI taxes and lower benefits 
in order to offset some of the recession’s impact on reserve 
ratios. This strategy clearly diminishes the countercyclical 
potential of UI and seems undesirable from a macroeconomic 
perspective. It is important to remember that experience rating 
already has a tendency to make UI payroll taxes procyclical, 
because firms that lay off workers typically will see their tax 
rates rise automatically.
Another way of assessing the extent to which UI counteracts 
the impact of recessions is to examine the so-called “BU 
ratio”—the ratio of UI beneficiaries to total unemployment. 
During the boom years of the 1990s, this ratio hovered around 
35 percent, implying that only a little more than a third of the 
unemployed received benefits at any time. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with this scenario: when the labour market is 
strong, many of the unemployed are people who quit their jobs 
or are seasonal workers who fully expected to be laid off, and 
many unemployment spells are of short duration. However, 
when a recession hits, one would expect that ratio to increase, 
as proportionately more of the unemployed will have been 
permanently laid off, and unemployment durations to rise. The 
BU ratio did rise in 2001, but only to 45 percent, a figure that 
includes temporary federal benefits. Thus, less than half of the 
unemployed were receiving UI, even at the height of the 
recession.
This discussion leads to the final question raised by 
Vroman—the role of the federal UI framework. The interest 
rate charged by the U.S. Treasury on loans to state UI 
programmes, other than short-term loans for cash-flow 
management purposes, is around 6 percent—a much higher 
rate than market interest rates on state debt. This rate seems 
high, given that the default risk for the U.S. Treasury on such 
loans is virtually nonexistent, as the Treasury has statutory 
power to recoup any money by reducing federal UI tax credits.
One potential argument for charging states a high rate of 
interest on loans from the U.S. Treasury is that easy access to 
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funds, which might never rebuild their reserve funds and 
simply accumulate larger and larger debts. However, this 
argument does not seem to be borne out by historical 
experience. Vroman’s paper finds that those states that issued 
bonds in the past had succeeded in rebuilding their reserve 
ratios by the end of the 1990s.
In conclusion, Vroman offers a wealth of information to 
policymakers. One hopes that the conclusions he points to are 
taken seriously, so that unemployment insurance can continue 
to play an important role in overall macroeconomic policy.Endnotes
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1. However, because the ten-year interval between the 2001 and 1990-
91 recessions was the longest on record, it gave states more than the 
usual amount of time to restore their balance sheets. 
See <http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html>.
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